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NOTES AND COMMENT

decision in the Lauson case has been often cited and although it has
been severely criticized in some jurisdictions, it still stands as the law
in Wisconsin.
ALFRED G. GOLDBERG
Conditional Sales: forfeiture.
In the case of Schneider v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 219 N.W. 370;
196 Wis. -, the plaintiff had contracted to buy, on the installment plan from the defendant, certain machinery to be manufactured
to order, and had made certain payments on account, aggregating
$24,400. The written contract of conditional sale provided:
Upon failure to make payments, or any of them, as herein specified, the company [i.e., the defendant] may retain any and all partial payments which have been made, as liquidated damages.
Plaintiff being in default, prior to the delivery of any of the machinery, the defendant is alleged to have resold the machinery and to have
sustained no actual damage. Whereupon the plaintiff sued for a return
of the partial payments, on the theory of unjust enrichment. Defendant
demurred. Demurrer sustained.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that:
The parties having lawfully and expressly contracted for just
such a situation as arose, the law will make no other contract for
them.
Although Wisconsin has both the uniform sales act and the uniform
conditional sales act, the Court unfortunately mentioned neither. As
William M. Hargest says on page 181 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for December, 1927, in his article on "Keeping
the Uniform Laws Uniform":
The courts have rather consistently failed to preserve uniformity.
There are two rather outstanding reasons for this failure. One
is the tendency of courts to adhere to stare decisis, and the other
the failure to even refer to the statute law of their own state
which governs the principle in the case .....
.The
courts in
states which have adopted the Uniform Sales Act, when deciding
questions to which that Act applied failed to even refer to the
Act in 353 cases, while 941 cases cited it.
Of course, the conditional sales act cannot apply to such a case until
the goods have been delivered unless the words "is delivered" in Sec.
i of that act be construed to mean "is to be delivered." Otherwise,
the decision under review might have the effect of removing from the
protection of the act all conditional sales of made-to-order goods, for
the Court said:
The defendant was certainly under no duty to the buyer to take
any steps or legal proceedings either as to the machinery, title
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to which remained in the seller until paid for in full, or as to the
defaulted payments.
Compare the recent Georgia decision, to the effect that a valid conditional sale can not be made of goods not specific and ascertained at the
date of contract. Stevens v. Bank, 129 S.E. 172; 34 Ga. App. 268.
But the uniform sales act clearly applies. In fact the Wisconsin
Court expressly refers to the parties as "buyer" and "seller." Instead
of disregarding this act, and/or holding that the sale in question was
not a "sale," the Court could perfectly well have based its decision
on the principle that, where the terms of the contract are such as
the parties thereto have a legal right to make, the rights of the parties
must be governed thereby rather than by.the uniform sales act. Cadillac
v. Mitchell, 205 Mich. 107; 171 N.W. 479.

Compare the non-waiver

provisions of Sec. 26 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
As the Wisconsin Court did not discuss these points, the Schneider
opinion leaves the law in a very uncertain and unsatisfactory state.
It would seem to the reviewer that the Schneider opinion would have
been much more convincing and instructive, if the Court had cited
and distinguished both of the uniform acts involved. For, as- the
matter now stands, it will be possible to reverse the Schneider decision
at some later date on the principle latent in Sherer v. Long, 149 N.E.
225; 318 Ill. 432, that a decision rendered in ignorance of a statute
is not binding on the Court when that statute is called to the Court's attention in a later case. And compare 15 C.J. 958, note I9, h and i.
Such a decision is not binding even on inferiorcourts. Central v. Jones,
Iio S.E. 914; 28 Ga. App. 258.

The Schneider decision can perhaps be sustained on the theory that
the sale of goods to be made to order is not a sale. There is some
authority for this proposition. It is stated in 35 Cyc. 4o that, where
the statute of frauds is not involved, the same rule must be followed
as though it were involved. The rule under statutes of frauds is discussed at length in 27 C. J. 233 to 236. The Uniform Sales Act (Wis.
Statutes, 1927, sec. 25) treats contracts to manufacture and sell, as
contracts of sale, unless the goods are to be manufactured especially
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary
course of the seller's business; even then the act does not say that the
contract is not a sale, but rather merely that the statute of frauds
shall not apply. All decisions on this point, so far noted under the
Uniform Sales Act, are merely declaratory of this section 25, except
Goralnik v. Delohery, 12o Atl. 283; 98 Conn. 56o, and Continental v:
Tri-Continental, 198 N.Y.S. 753, both of which hold categorically that
a contract to sell goods to be manufactured is a contract of sale. No
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decisions in this connection have been noted under the uniform conditional sales act.
ROGER SHERMSAN HoAR*
Conflicts of Laws: Divorce: Marriage in another state before
the expiration of one year after entry of div6rce.
A case of interest to Wisconsin as a whole was recently decided
by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Mosholder v. Industrial Commission et al, i6o N.E. 8&5.
This was a proceeding under the Workman's Compensation Act before the Industrial Commission by one Hannah Wilcox, who claims
to be the widow of William Wilcox for compensation for the latter's
death. The lower court awarded compensation to Hannah Wilcox, and
the employer, Ralph Mosholder, brought the cause before the Supreme
Court on a writ of error.
The exact question in the case was whether Hannah Wilcox at the
time of the accident and death of William Wilcox was the lawful wife
of deceased. The facts leading up to the question were these: Claimant
married Wilcox in Wisconsin in 189 ° and they were divorced in 1896.
In the latter part of 1896 he married one known in the record as Mary
Wilcox. On June 21, 1922, Mary Wilcox procured a divorce from
Wilcox in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. On October 2, 1922, the divorce
was granted, claimant remarried Wilcox in Illinois. There is no question as to her good faith in this marriage.
Sec. 247.37 of the Wisconsin Statutes declares that where a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony is granted so far as it
affects the status of the parties, it shall not be effective until the expiration of one year from the date of entry of such judgment. By
subsection 3 of this section it is made the duty of every judge who
enters a judgment of divorce to inform the parties appearing in court
that the judgment so far as it affects the status of the parties will not
become effective until one year from the date when such judgment is
entered.
Counsel for the claimant argued vigorously on the question whether
the decree of Wisconsin was binding on William Wilcox in Illinois.
The Court considered the Wisconsin cases of White v. White" and
Hiller v. Johnson.2 In the first case our Supreme Court held that under
sec. 247.37 of the statutes, the marriage is not absolutely severed until
one year has expired from the entry of judgment and that under subsection 2 of sec. 245.03 if either party marries again during the year,
such marriage shall be null and void even though contracted in another
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.

167 Wis. 615; 168 N. W. 704.
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Wis.

19;

I54 N. W. 845.

